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Abstract 
This paper examines the EU’s external power through the prism of perceptions by 
non-EU countries of the aims of EU foreign policies, as shown in the Western 
Balkans. The paper argues that the EU’s policy in the Western Balkans lacks a strong 
normative justification, which affects the degree of compliance with the EU’s 
demands in areas related to state sovereignty. The perceived lack of legitimacy 
opens up political space for domestic actors to contest the positions taken by the EU 
on normative grounds. The Western Balkan countries have responded by giving 
preference to internal sources of legitimacy and asserting domestic reasons for fake 
compliance, partial compliance or non-compliance with the EU’s conditions, with the 
latter provoking imposed compliance. The EU’s transformative leverage in the 
r e g i o n  h a s  b e e n  m u c h  w e a k e r  t o  d a t e  i n  comparison with that in Central and 
Eastern Europe prior to EU accession. 
The paper also makes the case for widening the debate about EU foreign policy to 
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the context of the EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. 
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FAKE, PARTIAL AND IMPOSED COMPLIANCE 
THE LIMITS OF THE EU’S NORMATIVE POWER 
IN THE WESTERN BALKANS 
GERGANA NOUTCHEVA* 
1. Introduction 
The growing political weight of the European Union (EU) in international politics has stimulated a 
lot of discussion about the nature and facets of the EU’s external power. The question of “what kind 
of power” the EU represents (Sjursen, 2006) has generated arguments in support of both the 
“normative power Europe” (Manners, 2002 and 2006) and the “strategic power Europe” (Youngs, 
2004; Hyde-Price, 2006), with the debate as to what drives EU foreign policy remaining 
inconclusive to date. Academic contributions to the study of European foreign policy have 
predominantly focused on conceptualising the EU’s internal policy processes and institutional 
relationships while neglecting the external impact of the EU’s foreign policy (Smith, 2006).  
At the same time, scholars of the EU’s enlargement have been studying the effects of the “EU’s 
transformative power” (Grabbe, 2006) on the candidate countries, observing the profound domestic 
changes that occurred in Central and Eastern Europe in the context of preparations for EU 
accession. Concerned primarily with the EU’s external impact on this specific kind of non-member 
country, the Europeanisation literature has offered interesting insights into the mechanisms of EU 
influence on the domestic structures of these countries and the reasons for their compliance with EU 
conditions (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004 and 2005; Grabbe, 2001 and 2006; Jacoby, 2004; 
Kelley, 2004; Vachudova, 2005). 
These two specific strands of the scholarly debate about the EU’s external relations have developed 
in parallel, notwithstanding the linkages between them. On the one hand, conclusions about the 
EU’s normative power or strategic leverage cannot be drawn without considering the reactions of 
non-EU countries to the EU’s policies or assessing the EU’s impact ‘on the ground’. On the other 
hand, evaluations of non-member states’ responses to the EU’s external actions cannot be credible 
without taking into account their perceptions of the EU’s motivations for pursuing certain policy 
objectives in the first place.  
In an attempt to bridge these two distinct bodies of research, this paper analyses the EU’s influence 
in the Western Balkans by studying the compliance responses of Balkan candidates to the EU’s 
statehood conditions and how these responses have been affected by domestic views of the overall 
purpose of the EU’s actions. The Western Balkans present a good case for the objective of this 
analysis because they have been on the receiving end of both the EU’s common foreign and security 
policy (CFSP) and enlargement policy. The EU’s involvement in the region for the time being 
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cannot be clearly categorised under either foreign or enlargement policy. As a result, neither the 
conceptual tools of foreign policy analysis nor those of Europeanisation are entirely suited to 
explaining the EU’s impact on the state structures in the region.  
The paper argues that the EU’s policy in the Western Balkans lacks a strong normative justification, 
which affects the degree of compliance with the EU’s demands on sovereignty-related issues. The 
Balkans’ challenge to the EU’s normative influence plays out in the politics of compliance and 
manifests itself in these countries contesting the appropriateness of the EU’s pressure on them to 
undertake specific domestic changes. When Balkan political leaders openly confront the EU about 
the kinds of conditions being set, they not only question the normative foundations of the EU’s 
policies but also reject the EU’s external authority and assert domestic reasons for partial 
compliance or non-compliance. Compliant outcomes in such cases are more the result of the EU’s 
strategic leverage than of voluntary submission to the EU’s normative power and are vulnerable to 
reversals in the short run. 
The argument unfolds in two steps. First, the paper demonstrates that the EU’s policy of 
conditionality vis-à-vis three Western Balkan cases – Serbia and Montenegro during 2002–06, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Serbia and Kosovo – has been based on strategic interests 
rather than normative considerations or moral concerns. Second, the paper shows that domestic 
actors in the three cases have tried to challenge the normative grounds of the EU’s policy and have 
responded with fake compliance, partial compliance and non-compliance, respectively, with the 
latter provoking imposed compliance. The paper maintains that the legitimacy of the EU’s demands 
as perceived by domestic political actors is key for explaining the divergent compliance responses 
of the Western Balkan countries.  
2.  Legitimisation and the EU’s policy in the Western Balkans 
What drives the EU’s policy in the Western Balkans and how does the EU justify its demands in 
Western Balkan countries? The scholarly debate on these questions has been rather thin but the 
literature on enlargement offers insights into possible explanations. Smith (2004) and Vachudova 
(2005) give primacy to the material interests (both economic and geopolitical) of the EU member 
states in an undivided Europe as a major explanatory variable for the EU’s enlargement decisions. 
In contrast, Schimmelfennig (2001) holds that rational arguments can only partially explain the 
EU’s enlargement policy. These can account for the EU’s offer of association through the Europe 
Agreements to the Eastern European countries but cannot explain why the EU agreed to share 
political power through full institutional inclusion of the Eastern European states (Schimmelfennig, 
2001). Rhetorical action provides the missing bit of the puzzle according to Schimmelfennig, who 
argues that reluctant EU member states were “rhetorically entrapped” and shamed into approving 
enlargement by those member states that championed it. Sjursen (2002) goes a step further and 
maintains that the EU’s Community-based identity is at the core of the EU’s motivation to enlarge 
eastwards. “Ethical-political reasons which testify to a sense of kinship-based duty” are seen by 
Sjursen as crucial to understanding the shape and substance of the EU’s enlargement policy. 
Compared with Central and Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans are a special category of 
accession candidates and the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) is a special version of the 
EU’s enlargement policy. While also devised as a pre-accession mechanism by the EU, the 
separation of the SAP from the enlargement policy signals important differences. First, there is the 
timetable – the SAP was launched much later than the enlargement process and was perceived from 
the very beginning as a weaker derivative of the enlargement process. Only in 2000 did the EU THE LIMITS OF THE EU’S NORMATIVE POWER IN THE WESTERN BALKANS | 3 
 
extend the membership perspective to the Western Balkan countries, a decade after making its first 
steps towards engaging the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The other important 
differences between the SAP and the enlargement policy have to do with the conditions attached to 
the promise of membership. The former Yugoslav republics of the Western Balkans that were 
involved in the secessionist wars of the 1990s not only had a delayed transition but also the initial 
conditions from which they started presupposed the resolution of outstanding statehood questions. 
The EU’s conditions with respect to these former war adversaries intervened in these highly 
sensitive political matters by suggesting a vision for the political map of the region and internal 
state structures against the promise of EU membership.  
Considering the specificities of the domestic contexts in the Western Balkans, how does the EU 
justify its conditionality policy in the framework of the SAP and in particular its demands in 
relation to sovereignty issues? Sjursen and Smith (2004) suggest three ways of legitimising the 
EU’s foreign policy: a logic of consequences, a logic of appropriateness and a logic of moral 
justification. The first approach is based on a rational model of action and it justifies policy 
outcomes with reference to efficient problem-solving. The second approach employs normative 
arguments identified with a community of values to legitimise foreign policy positions. The third 
approach rests on universal principles of fairness and justice and validates foreign policy choices on 
moral grounds, irrespective of actors’ interests or identities (Sjursen & Smith, 2004).  
Applied to the EU’s policy in the Western Balkans, these logics yield different interpretations of 
what the EU does and the motivation behind its particular stances. More importantly, the EU puts 
different emphasis on the way it justifies its policy of conditionality to domestic actors in the 
various Western Balkan countries – a differentiation closely linked to the specificity of each case. 
Yet, the security rationale for the EU’s demands on sovereignty issues appears overarching across 
the Western Balkans, as illustrated below with evidence from Serbia and Montenegro, BiH, and 
Serbia and Kosovo.  
2.1  Serbia and Montenegro  
The experiment with building a State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, one of the very first EU-
supported state-building projects in the Western Balkans, ended with a ‘velvet divorce’ after three 
years of existence, during which the common state failed to capture the imagination of its 
population. A sizable majority of Montenegrin citizens (about 55%) voted in favour of 
independence in a referendum in May 2006, thus putting an end to the precarious state-like 
formation (Friis, 2007). The event was celebrated by some as a success of the EU’s soft power, 
mainly owing to the peaceful and democratic separation of the two constituent republics of the 
common state (Batt, 2006). Yet, many saw it as a failed attempt to propose and force upon domestic 
actors a ready-made solution from the outside, which did not enjoy the critical mass of domestic 
support necessary to stand a chance of surviving.  
Between 2001 and 2006, the EU’s policy towards Serbia and Montenegro clearly favoured the 
preservation of a common state for the two republics. The EU demanded the reconstitution of the 
international legal sovereignty of Serbia and Montenegro as a single subject under international law 
and the continuation of a (thin) layer of common institutions and policies. High Representative for 4 | GERGANA NOUTCHEVA
  
 
the CFSP Javier Solana mediated the negotiations between the two republics and signed the 
Belgrade Agreement on behalf of the EU as guarantor and arbiter in March 2002.
1  
The domino theory of spillover effects from further disintegration in former Yugoslavia is most 
frequently invoked by EU officials to explain the EU’s policy towards Serbia and Montenegro in 
the period mentioned.
2 In the words of EU representatives themselves, regional stability and the 
EU’s interests in it are most often cited as the drivers of the EU’s involvement in the constitutional 
impasse between Serbia and Montenegro. The reference to the EU’s security concerns is important 
in this context. Heavily engaged politically, financially and militarily in the stabilisation and 
consolidation of BiH and Kosovo, the EU has been cautious not to upset the fragile peace reached 
in the Balkans at the end of the 1990s. The fear of yet another wave of violence overpowered any 
argument favouring a scenario other than that of a single state solution for Serbia and Montenegro.
3 
Thus, a decision acquiescing to Montenegro’s independence in 2001 (and thereby indirectly 
encouraging latent secessionist sentiments in the region) was not one the EU was prepared to take at 
that time.    
Norms and rules of efficient governance could not be easily used by the EU to explain why 
harmonisation and policy coordination between Serbia and Montenegro was better from an 
economic point of view. In fact, in economic terms there was a strong logic supporting the 
continued separate management of the two very different economies (Gros et al., 2004). With 
divergent trade policies, reflecting structural differences between the service-oriented, outward-
looking Montenegro and the industrial, inward-looking Serbia, and separate monetary regimes, 
resulting from the unilateral introduction by Montenegro of the Deutsche Mark in 1999 and then the 
euro in 2002, the case for reintegrating the Montenegrin and Serbian economies was rather weak 
and open to challenge.  
In addition, there was no moral case to be made as to why the other former Yugoslav republics 
(Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia) could go their separate ways whereas Montenegro was 
required to stay with Serbia in a re-created mini Yugoslavia. One could argue that there was a 
strong moral imperative to try to avoid another Balkan tragedy following the European failure to 
prevent and then stop the Balkan bloodshed of the 1990s. Moral arguments undoubtedly weighed 
heavily on the EU’s decision to extend the membership perspective to the whole Western Balkan 
region in 2000.
4 Compared with the Eastern European enlargement, however, where the theme of 
historical reunification of the Continent and the moral obligation of Western Europe to integrate 
Eastern Europe was prevalent in official discourse,
5 the EU’s responsibility with respect to the 
Western Balkans was uncomfortably articulated, mostly in private and mainly with reference to 
Europe’s disappointing behaviour during the Balkan wars of the 1990s.
6 Yet, moral justifications  
 
                                                 
1 See the text of the Belgrade Agreement, reprinted in CEPS Europa South-East Monitor, No. 32, CEPS, 
Brussels, March 2002 (available from http://www.ceps.be).  
2 Derived from interviews with EU officials, May 2002–September 2004.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid. 
5 In virtually every official speech on enlargement by senior EU representatives in the late 1990s and the 
2000s, enlargement was referred to as a ‘historic opportunity’. 
6 Derived from interviews with EU officials, May 2002–September 2004. THE LIMITS OF THE EU’S NORMATIVE POWER IN THE WESTERN BALKANS | 5 
 
cannot explain why a common state outcome was deemed superior to a two-state solution, 
irrespective of the overall context in which the EU decided to step up its engagement with the 
Western Balkans in 2000.  
In short, rational calculations rather than norms or moral duties seem better at explaining the EU’s 
initial insistence on establishing the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The security interests of 
the EU member states overwhelmingly dominated the political thinking of EU policy-makers when 
the decision to push for a common state between Serbia and Montenegro was made.
7 Attempts at 
persuasion were unsuccessful in changing the hearts and minds of domestic elites who were 
opposed to the EU’s vision of state frontiers and state authority in the region.  
In fact, the EU itself was reluctant to apply negative conditionality when faced with non-
compliance, knowing the unintended effects of its intervention and fearing destabilisation of the 
region as a consequence of its indirect support for nationalist and illiberal political forces 
(Noutcheva & Huysseune, 2004). It subsequently relaxed its sovereignty conditionality on two 
occasions. First, when the EU’s economic demands met firm resistance particularly by the 
authorities in Podgorica, it agreed in autumn 2004 to conduct separate ‘twin-track’ trade talks with 
the two republics in the framework of negotiating a single Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
(SAA) with the State Union.
8 Second, when Montenegro declared its intention to call a referendum 
on independence, a right enshrined in the Belgrade Agreement, the EU worked with the political 
parties in the government and opposition to find a consensus on the conditions under which a 
positive vote would be considered legitimate and would earn the republic international recognition. 
In the aftermath of the referendum, the EU was quick to acknowledge the result and to call on its 
member states to recognise the new state on the European map.
9 
2.2  Bosnia and Herzegovina  
If there is a single feature that captures the essence of the state structure of BiH, it is 
decentralisation in extreme forms (Bose, 2002).
10 The state of BiH is a federation consisting of two 
entities, one that is a unitary state-like structure, the Republika Srpska (RS), and another that is a 
decentralised federation itself, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, comprising 10 cantons. 
The institutional structure emerged as a compromise among the warring parties in 1995 when the 
Dayton Peace Accords were signed under heavy international pressure and mediation. Its principal 
objective was putting an end to the violent conflict between the Serbs, Croats and Bosnians.   
 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 See the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), Council Conclusions on the Western 
Balkans, 2609
th Meeting, Luxembourg, 11 October 2004. 
9 See the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), Council Conclusions on Montenegro, 
2737
th Meeting, Luxembourg, 12 June 2006.  
10 Article 3.1 of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina assigns the following policy areas to the common 
state level of governance: foreign policy, foreign trade policy, customs policy, monetary policy, immigration, 
refugee and asylum policy, international and inter-entity criminal law enforcement, establishment and 
operation of common and international communications facilities, regulation of inter-entity transport, and air 
traffic control. All other competencies are the exclusive prerogative of the entities. 6 | GERGANA NOUTCHEVA
  
 
The Dayton Agreement proposed an institutional set-up that aimed at providing maximum 
guarantees to the three ethnic communities to prevent future conflict by assuring their equality and 
avoiding ethnic domination in the state structures.
11 
Efficiency, rationality and financial sustainability were clearly not among the guiding principles in 
devising the institutions of political representation in BiH. The country’s population of 3.8 million 
is governed by no fewer than 14 governments – 1 at the state level, 2 at the entity level, 10 at the 
cantonal level and 1 for the district of Brcko.
12 For a country with a GDP per capita of $2,425,
13 the 
financial consequences of the multi-tiered governance system are serious. Many analysts estimate 
that the cost of the multiple levels of public administration is not affordable for a country with 
BiH’s level of development.
14  
The EU was not responsible for achieving the initial conflict settlement in BiH, nor was it involved 
in direct mediation between the conflict parties. With the inception of the SAP in 2000, the EU 
offered incentives to BiH politicians to strengthen the central level of government as a pre-requisite 
for integration with the EU. In essence, the reforms demanded by the EU as conditions for 
establishing contractual relations with BiH link its membership prospects to changes in the internal 
state structure of BiH. The long-term objective of building democratic institutions, securing the rule 
of law, encouraging the creation of a professional public administration and an efficient judicial 
system are certainly high on the EU’s pre-accession agenda. Yet, in the BiH context, the goal of 
state-building and state consolidation is dominant and identifiable in the insistence on passing state-
level legislation and strengthening the state-level institutions in all spheres of reform.  
Examples from two policy areas illustrate the latter point – police reform and reform of the indirect 
taxation system. Regarding the first example, the EU requirement of “tackling crime, especially 
organized crime, and building state-level enforcement capacity”
15 has meant a thorough 
restructuring of the police sector in BiH. In particular, the Commission has laid out three core 
principles for police reform in the country, the respect of which would satisfy the pre-SAA 
requirements: “1) exclusive police competence at the BiH level, but operational control at the local 
level; 2) police areas drawn up on the grounds of operational efficiency, not political control; and 3) 
 
                                                 
11 See Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion 
on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High Representative, CDL-
AD(2005)004, Strasbourg, 11 March 2005 (available from http://www.venice.coe.int). 
12 See Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2004: Bosnia – Herzegovina, Freedom House, Washington, D.C., 
2004 (retrieved from http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htm). 
13 See European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Transition Report 2006, EBRD, 
London, 2006 (data are for 2005).  
14 For details on BiH’s public finances, see European Stability Initiative (ESI), Governance and Democracy in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-Industrial Society and the Authoritarian Temptation, ESI, Berlin and Sarajevo, 
2004 (available from http://www.esiweb.org). 
15 See European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council on the preparedness of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to negotiate a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union (Feasibility 
Study) COM(2003) 692 final, Brussels, 18 November 2003. THE LIMITS OF THE EU’S NORMATIVE POWER IN THE WESTERN BALKANS | 7 
 
no political interference in policing”.
16 Compliance with the police reform requirements goes 
through to entrusting the state with more competences in law enforcement and institutional build-up 
beyond the entity level. 
Reform of the indirect taxation system, through the creation of a single customs administration and 
the establishment of tax collection at the state level,
17 has involved ceding competences to the state 
by the entity governments and has resulted in a more integrated decision-making system for 
economic policy. The internal redistribution of power between the centre and the entities has in 
essence shifted the locus of authority and restructured the power relations within the country. The 
stated final goal of the reform is economic – improving the efficiency of the public finance system 
of BiH. The attainment of this objective, however, is inherently political in nature and has serious 
consequences for the distribution of power among the various layers of authority within the state.  
The EU has justified its demands vis-à-vis BiH on efficiency grounds and has repeatedly pointed to 
deficiencies in the governing structures of BiH in order to press for change. If BiH is to become an 
EU member state, so the EU’s argument goes, it has to achieve European standards of domestic 
governance. Thus, to persuade BiH politicians and the public at large of the necessity of police 
reform, the EU has highlighted the benefits of rationalising the police forces in the country.
18 The 
fragmentation of police authority in BiH allows for the easy escape of criminals among 
compartmentalised police jurisdictions with no central oversight. To fight crime more effectively 
and ensure law and order for all citizens, a single police structure is essential.
19 In this way, the EU 
has pragmatically appealed to the common sense of domestic political leaders, trying to make them 
see the virtues of undertaking the reforms themselves rather than presenting the reforms as a 
sacrifice they have to accept in order to be admitted to the club.  
Similarly, to push forward reforms of the taxation system, the EU has exposed the magnitude of 
fraud to which the unreformed BiH structures were prone. To convince BiH politicians to sign up to 
the tax reform proposals, the EU has repeatedly made the point that such reforms would result in the 
state and the entities generating more revenue for the budget and having more money for public 
spending.
20 Only a radical reform of the system could prevent the massive losses of revenue, which 
in 2002–03 stood at more than 4% of the national GDP.
21  
 
                                                 
16 See the speech by High Representative Paddy Ashdown to the RS National Assembly reminding RS 
parliamentarians of these principles (Office of the High Representative and EU Special Representative, “High 
Representative Calls for Agreement on Police Reform to Enter Europe”, Press Release, Sarajevo, 21 April 
2005 (available from http://www.ohr.int).  
17 See the Law on the Indirect Taxation System in Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted in December 2003, after 
intensive domestic negotiations under international supervision in the framework of the Indirect Taxation 
Policy Commission chaired by Jolly Dixon.  
18 See documents under the heading “Police Restructuring in Bosnia and Herzegovina” on the website of the 
Office of the High Representative and EU Special Representative (available from http://www.ohr.int/ohr-
dept/rule-of-law-pillar/prc/). 
19 Derived from interviews with EU Commission officials, Brussels, May–July 2005. 
20 Derived from interviews with EU Council officials, Brussels, April–May 2004.  
21 See International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bosnia and Herzegovina: Selected Economic Issues, IMF Country 
Report No. 05/198, IMF, Washington, D.C., June 2005.  8 | GERGANA NOUTCHEVA
  
 
The logic of consequences is clearly discernible in the arguments used by EU representatives in 
trying to coerce BiH politicians to comply with the EU’s pre-accession requirements. By 
interjecting incentives and disincentives in the rational cost-benefit calculus of BiH political 
elites, the EU has primarily sought to justify its demands as a reaction to the problems identified in 
the country’s domestic structures. 
Appeals to European standards of governance as the justification for the EU’s conditions have also 
featured strongly in the EU’s strategy for BiH. While serving as High Representative (HR) of the 
international community (who is also an EU special representative) between May 2002 and January 
2006, Paddy Ashdown frequently referred to the ‘Europe argument’ to convince domestic actors to 
acquiesce to the institutional and policy changes sought by the EU. His message was simple but 
powerful – that the EU will not water down its norms of what is appropriate from a domestic 
governance standpoint and it is up to BiH to live up to EU standards.
22 Paddy Ashdown thus 
repeatedly reinforced the legitimacy of EU conditionality by arguing that the EU’s conditions are an 
absolute must for BiH’s return to the European mainstream. He also publicly shamed those BiH 
politicians who stood for narrow political interests and obstructed BiH’s progress towards EU 
membership.  
The rationale of moral justification does not directly explain the EU’s concrete demands with 
respect to BiH. The moral responsibility of the EU member states with regard to the future of BiH 
may well account for the EU’s commitment to integrate the country but is a weak basis for 
justifying the internal institutional rearrangement of key power relationships within a candidate 
state as a requirement for joining the club. Even the reference to European Community values is 
stretched in this context since there are no common rules concerning the internal institutional set-up 
within countries and the EU member states are very diverse in their organisation, with both highly 
decentralised (Belgium) and highly centralised (France) states equally eligible for participation in 
EU decision-making.  
In short, the utility justification seems most authoritative in the case of BiH, with regard to both 
‘selling’ EU policy to domestic actors in BiH and defending the EU’s position within the EU 
member states. A resurgence of violence reminiscent of the Bosnian war of the early 1990s is 
certainly not a scenario anyone in Europe would like to see repeated, and in this sense the policy of 
state consolidation in BiH is seen by the EU as a security measure. 
2.3 Serbia  and  Kosovo 
So far, the EU has not been directly responsible for the state-building efforts of the international 
community in Kosovo since the province became a UN protectorate in 1999. Although the EU’s 
direct financial contributions to Kosovo’s reconstruction and development have represented the 
largest external donation by far, totalling over €1.1 billion in the period 1999–2006,
23 the EU has 
kept a low profile when it comes to the sensitive issue of Kosovo’s final status. Instead, it has 
emphasised its secondary role in a UN-led political process.  
                                                 
22  See, for instance, Office of the High Representative and EU Special Representative, “New Year’s Message 
to the People of Bosnia & Herzegovina from Paddy Ashdown, High Representative and European Union 
Special Representative”, Sarajevo, 31 December 2003 (available from http://www. http://www.ohr.int). 
23 See the European Commission’s website page, “EU – Kosovo Relations” (retrieved from http://ec.europa. 
eu/enlargement/serbia/kosovo/eu_kosovo_relations_en.htm).  THE LIMITS OF THE EU’S NORMATIVE POWER IN THE WESTERN BALKANS | 9 
 
Remaining ambiguous about the final settlement, the EU heads of state and government have 
outlined the parameters of what would constitute an acceptable solution in a special Declaration on 
Kosovo adopted by the Brussels European Council in June 2005. Listing the objectionable solutions 
from an EU point of view such as “partition of Kosovo, [or]…union of Kosovo with another 
country or with part of another country”,
24 the Declaration does not exclude independence from the 
menu of acceptable outcomes.  
While avoiding taking a direct, official position on Kosovo’s final status, the discussion among 
member states in the Council has leaned towards emphasising the sui generis features of the 
Kosovo case.
25 One of the unique characteristics argued to have no parallels with other ‘frozen 
conflicts’ is the UN’s presence on the ground since 1999 as a direct consequence of NATO’s 
intervention to stop the violence against the Albanian population instigated by the late Milosevic 
regime. Following the years-long rule of the province by the UN in denial of the official 
sovereignty of Serbia over Kosovo, there is no conceivable alternative to independence, as the 
argument goes (Patten, 2007; ICG, 2007).
26  
Furthermore, the perpetuation of underdevelopment in Kosovo owing to its undefined status has 
increasingly been seen as an argument in favour of speeding up the final settlement of the 
province’s statehood. Kosovo will remain a black hole in the Balkan region breeding criminality 
and poverty and thus a problem for European security unless there is clarity about its future 
direction. In short, pragmatic reasons have contributed to the emerging consensus that the time has 
come to acknowledge realities on the ground and accept what has become the only possible solution 
to the problem, namely the legal separation of the two sides and eventually the recognition of a new 
state on the map of Europe.  
In addition, the high degree of popular support for full independence in Kosovo itself (90% of the 
population favour this outcome), coupled with the extensive mobilisation of Kosovar society 
backing this cause as evidenced by the riots in Pristina in March 2005, has been a serious factor in 
evaluating the sustainability of any status outcome. Irrespective of whether independence is a right 
or just solution, the threat of revolt by the local population against a different final result, possibly 
targeting the international presence in the province, has enhanced the growing international consent 
to Kosovo’s eventual independence.
27  
The EU’s security approach to the Kosovo question is also evident in the intense preparations for 
the EU’s post-settlement role in Kosovo even before its final status has been decided. An EU 
Planning Team has been deployed there following a Council Decision in April 2006 to make 
arrangements for a future European security and defence policy operation focusing on the judicial 
sector and the police.
28 The EU is also to take over considerable responsibilities related to the 
                                                 
24 See the Declaration on Kosovo (Annex III) in European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels 
European Council of 16-17 June, SN 10255/1/05, Brussels, 18 June (retrieved from http://www.consilium. 
europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/DeclarationKosovo.pdf).  
25 See also the speech by European Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn, “Introductory Remarks on 
Western Balkans”, SPEECH/07/170, delivered at the European Parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Brussels, 21 March 2007(a) (available from http://www.europa.eu).  
26 Derived from interviews with EU member state officials in Brussels, October 2006–March 2007. 
27 Ibid.  
28 See European Council, “EU Prepares for Resolution to Kosovo’s Political Status”, ESDP Newsletter, No. 3, 
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international civilian presence after the decision on the final settlement (Papadimitriou, Petrov & 
Greiçevci, 2007). The future international civil representative is expected to be an EU special 
representative as well, similar to the situation in BiH.  
The plan to grant Kosovo a sort of ‘supervised independence’ is hard to reconcile with universal 
principles. The big dilemma underpinning Kosovo’s independence bid is whether to give 
precedence to the right to self-determination or to the principle of territorial integrity. The latter, 
also known as respect for state sovereignty or the inviolability of state borders, is a fundamental 
principle enshrined in the UN Charter and as such forms the basis of the international system of 
governance. From an international legal viewpoint, therefore, supporters of Kosovo’s independence 
are potential violators of an important norm of the international system. In the same vein of 
argumentation, the acknowledgment of Kosovo’s right to self-determination may open a ‘Pandora’s 
box’ of secessionist claims within or outside the EU.  
This position has been vehemently supported not only by Serbian interlocutors who oppose 
Kosovo’s independence but also by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who sees Kosovo as a 
potential precedent-setting case that could be applied to other secessionist entities in the post-Soviet 
space such as Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh (Socor, 2007). Given 
that Russia has shown interests in backing the secessionist entities in its ‘near abroad’ and 
reasserting itself as a player to reckon with on the international scene, it may have specific 
instrumental reasons for adopting such an attitude with respect to Serbia and Kosovo (Headley, 
2007). In fact, Russia has made it clear that it will block any solution that has not been approved by 
the authorities in Belgrade, prompting Western diplomats to suspect that it could demand a price 
from the US and the EU in exchange for its eventual abstention in the UN Security Council vote on 
Kosovo’s independence (Peel, 2007).  
Yet, it is not only Russia that is alarmed by the potential infringement of the state sovereignty rule. 
In fact, the hesitation of some EU member states in supporting Kosovo’s independence
29 stems 
from the same concern about the potential violation of the established international norm of 
safeguarding state borders. It is hardly surprising that countries with sizable domestic minorities 
such as Spain, Slovakia and Romania have had the greatest tendency to be lukewarm about 
accepting Kosovo’s eventual independence and apprehensive about the broader repercussions of a 
possible precedent (Rettman & Krasniqi, 2007). Unlike the republics of the former Yugoslav 
Federation, which were deemed eligible for independent statehood by the Badinter Commission in 
1992, Kosovo only had the status of an autonomous province within the Republic of Serbia and as 
such was not granted the right of secession, despite enjoying large autonomy on domestic 
governance issues comparable to that of the republics within the Federation (Woodward, 1995). 
Yet, from a strictly international legal view, it is the Republic of Serbia’s borders that are protected 
by the international principle of territorial integrity.  
The point at which Kosovo’s bid for independence wins the sympathy of the international 
community rests on the threat of genocide to its population in 1999 by the Milosevic regime. 
Indeed, it was the threatened expulsion of the ethnic Albanian citizens living in the province and the 
massive scale of the violation of their human rights that legitimised the NATO-led Western 
intervention in defence of Kosovo. While this fact alone is not sufficient to justify secession from a 
                                                 
29 For differences among the EU member states, see D. Dombey and N. MacDonald, “Europe Divided over 
Kosovo”, Financial Times, 7 March 2007. THE LIMITS OF THE EU’S NORMATIVE POWER IN THE WESTERN BALKANS | 11 
 
recognised state, it is a key criterion for supporting an independence claim.
30 Related to it are the 
grievances of the Kosovar population and the almost unanimous rejection by the Kosovars of any 
institutional or other link with the authorities in Belgrade.  
These moral considerations are certainly at the back of EU policy-makers’ minds. It is possible that 
some of them are more strongly inclined to give precedence to moral arguments whereas others are 
more tuned to pragmatic reasoning about finding a feasible and sustainable solution to what the EU 
as a whole sees as a security problem. Nevertheless, where EU member states converge on the 
Kosovo question is on securing stability on the Continent, through embedding a final settlement of 
the conflict into the broader EU framework – a utility rationale that cannot be seriously challenged 
by the arguments of appropriateness or moral justification.   
3.  Legitimisation and compliance responses by the Western Balkan 
countries 
Deciphering the drivers of the EU’s policy towards the Western Balkans is important because it 
provides interesting insights into the reasons that motivate Balkan political leaders to comply with 
the EU’s demands. The literature suggests two possible explanations for compliance (Checkel, 
2001; Featherstone & Radaelli, 2002). One is based on rational-choice assumptions, assigning 
primary importance to actors’ cost-benefit calculations in making compliance decisions. The other 
focuses on norms and values, and accords higher explanatory power to normative considerations as 
a driver of behavioural change. A great number of studies have provided considerable evidence 
demonstrating the rational motives behind the compliance responses of Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries to the EU’s conditional offer of membership (Kelley, 2004; 
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Vachudova, 2005; Schimmelfennig, Engert & Knobel, 2006). 
A few studies have shown that normative dynamics are also important in understanding the overall 
context in which the EU–CEE pre-accession relationship evolved, although these dynamics cannot 
always account for the substance and timing of specific domestic changes that occurred in these 
states prior to EU accession (Jacoby, 2004; Grabbe, 2006). In short, the logic of consequences has 
often prevailed over the logic of appropriateness. 
The weak effects of socialisation on domestic elites have primarily been attributed to specific 
institutional and historical contexts, which can restrict the causal power of the social interaction 
process (Checkel, 2001). Many scholars studying the effects of international norms on state policy 
emphasise the salience of domestic receptivity to externally defined standards of appropriate 
behaviour. Checkel (1999), for instance, maintains that the success of norm diffusion in a certain 
context depends on the “degree of cultural match” between international norms and domestic 
practices. It may well be that the conditions in the Western Balkan countries are not very conducive 
to the socialisation of their political elites to European ways of governance and state behaviour. 
Such an analysis, however, misses an important aspect of the dynamics of EU conditionality –
Balkan compliance, namely the perceptions of the political elites in these countries of the 
motivation behind the EU’s policy and the related impact on compliance decisions. In other words, 
 
                                                 
30 Scholars have put forward the following criteria to examine the legitimacy of claims to secession: “just 
cause”, “right intentions”, “legitimate authority”, “likelihood of success”, “proportionality” and “last resort”. 
See B. Coppieters and R. Sakwa (eds), Contextualizing Secession – Normative Studies in Comparative 
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the softer mechanisms for inducing compliance may be less effective for reasons to do with the 
agent of socialisation, the EU in this case, rather than with the object of socialisation, the Balkan 
countries in this case.  
What is demonstrated in the remainder of this paper is that domestic understandings of the sources 
of legitimacy for EU conditionality affect whether or not local political leaders are receptive to 
normative arguments and persuasion by EU interlocutors. The argument here is that when the 
legitimacy of EU conditions is openly questioned by political players in the domestic context, one 
would expect them to assert more vigorously both their rational motives and distinctive identities in 
defiance of the EU’s demands. As a result, resistance to changes demanded by the EU and 
opposition to EU-compliant outcomes can be anticipated. And because in the Western Balkans the 
question of whether the EU is genuinely concerned about spreading its norms or is merely serving 
its own security interests has been more prominent in the political thinking on the receiving end of 
EU conditionality, compliance with conditions tied to sovereignty has been either fake or partial or 
imposed by external actors. When the EU’s policy lacks strong normative foundations, political 
leaders in non-EU countries tend to reject EU-sponsored ideas about what is right and appropriate 
for the governance and external relations of their states and tend to revert to domestic sources of 
legitimacy, no matter whether these are based on efficiency or identity. Their assertion of rational or 
normative reasons depends on the specific domestic context, which is shown in the cases of Serbia 
and Montenegro, BiH, and Serbia and Kosovo. The main point, however, is that the EU’s 
transformative leverage can be expected to be much weaker in such cases.  
3.1  Serbia and Montenegro  
Serbia and Montenegro’s compliance record with the EU’s conditions on a common state structure 
can be regarded as an example of fake compliance. The two republics simulated EU-compliant 
institutional and policy reforms between 2002 and 2006, which were rolled back once the 
Montenegrin referendum on independence succeeded. The legitimacy of the EU’s policy stance was 
seriously contested by domestic actors in both contexts as measured by the political mobilisation 
against the EU’s demands. The EU itself could not produce convincing arguments to persuade the 
Montenegrin and Serbian leaderships that a State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was better for 
the faster integration of the two republics into EU structures. In the absence of a strong normative 
justification for the EU’s demands, local players in both republics advanced strong rational 
arguments against the union backed by the EU.  
Seen from Podgorica, Montenegro was a victim of the EU’s larger geo-strategic concerns about 
security in the Balkans. In particular, the Montenegrin question was often put in the context of 
Kosovo’s undefined status and the ensuing reluctance to encourage further secessionist ideas in the 
Balkan region. From the EU’s standpoint, acquiescing to Montenegrin demands for independence in 
2001 would have sent the wrong signal to Kosovo, which, under UN administration and de facto 
separated from Serbian control, harboured its own ambitions about independent statehood.
31 The 
Montenegrin leaders, in turn, tried to use international sensitivities regarding Serbia’s unsettled 
relationship with Kosovo to press the case for an independent Montenegro. Arguing that   
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Montenegro could not be held hostage to domestic problems solely pertinent to Serbia, Montenegrin 
Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic sought to expose the injustice done to his republic by having been 
forced into a precarious union with Serbia.
32  
While the EU had difficulties justifying its position on a common state on normative grounds, the 
Montenegrin pro-independence bloc was able mobilise appealing arguments in favour of its 
preferred option, although these were to evolve over time. In 1997, when Slobodan Milosevic was 
still in power in Belgrade, Prime Minister Djukanovic used political arguments to defend the 
Montenegrin pro-independence case, affirming the democratic credentials of his republic and 
pointing to the authoritarian trend in Serbian politics (Darmanovic, 2003). But with the initial 
democratisation steps taken in Serbia after the fall of Milosevic in October 2000 and the ensuing 
shift of policy by the international community, this line was no longer sufficient to win international 
support for an independent Montenegro, not least because the democratisation processes in the 
republic itself fell short of international standards.  
The strongest Montenegrin objections to the common state had an economic foundation. Economic 
estimations had indicated that adoption by Montenegro of customs tariffs close to Serbian levels 
would translate into higher domestic prices for most goods in Montenegro owing to trade diversion 
effects and as such would constitute a very high cost for Montenegrin consumers (Gros, 2002).
33 
Economic re-integration with Serbia was consequently presented as harmful to the economic 
wellbeing of Montenegrin citizens and on these grounds it was blocked by the Montenegrin 
government. The EU subsequently dropped its demands on customs tariff harmonisation and 
adopted a twin-track approach towards the State Union, which applied particularly to trade matters.  
Identity arguments dwelling on Montenegro’s distinctive character as rooted in its independent 
historical path never gained credibility with EU representatives because of internal societal division 
on the question of independence, which manifested itself in an almost even divide or at most a tiny 
majority favouring an independent Montenegro.
34 Faced with an internally divided society, the EU 
interlocutors could not accept identity-based arguments in favour of separation from Serbia and 
dissolution of the State Union.
35  
Rather than blatantly defying the EU, Mr Djukanovic signed the Belgrade Agreement, which he 
never intended to implement in full. After the common state came into existence on paper, the tactic 
was quietly to sabotage the common state institutions. By disrupting the normal day-to-day 
functioning of the common structures, the whole initiative appeared flawed from the very start – a 
project that was impossible to implement from a technical standpoint. The Montenegrin opposition 
to the common state then switched to an institutional rationale and employed arguments that 
dwelled on the suggestion that the EU was backing an inefficient institutional solution, for which 
Montenegro could not be held accountable for not putting into practice. 
                                                 
32 Derived from interviews with senior Montenegrin officials, June–July 2003. 
33 Gros (2002) estimated the potential loss for the average household in Montenegro solely in the textile sector 
as €150 per year and for the Montenegrin economy as a whole in the region of €45 million annually.  
34 Numerous opinion polls conducted in Montenegro prior to the referendum showed a very narrow margin in 
favour of independence. See the public opinion polls in Montenegro published by the Centre for Democracy 
and Human Rights (CEDEM) in Podgorica on its website (available on www.cedem.cg.yu).  
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There were strong objections to the EU-backed common state from the Serbian side too, although 
these were of a different nature. Prior to signing the Belgrade Agreement, the major Serbian 
political actors were united in their insistence on a strong federal state with Montenegro. During the 
negotiations, the Serbian side maintained that a viable arrangement required a higher degree of 
centralisation of decision-making authority and a clear division of competences between the federal 
and the republican layers of government. Serbian interlocutors contended that a loose institutional 
structure like the State Union would not be efficient or lasting and would slow down both Serbia 
and Montenegro in meeting the EU’s pre-accession requirements.  
The political mobilisation against the common state gathered pace with the increasing 
disappointment in Serbia over the dysfunctional State Union and mounting criticism of the EU for 
not fulfilling its obligations under the Belgrade Agreement to mediate and arbitrate disagreements 
between the two parties in the implementation phase. With the launch in May 2003 of the anti-State 
Union platform
36 by a newly established political party, the G17 Plus, the arguments against EU 
conditionality on a common state became part of the political process and a matter of public debate. 
Advancing very concrete, rational arguments against the common state, the G17 Plus contested the 
State Union formation on four accounts: 
1)  the ineffectiveness of the administrative structures for common policy coordination; 
2)  the formula of equal political power-sharing, which was considered disproportionate to the 
size and economic weight of the two constituent units (a 50–50 ratio of political power-
sharing despite the 95–5 ratio of economic weight of Serbia and Montenegro, respectively);  
3)  the cost of financing the common institutions, largely relying on Serbia’s financial backing; 
and 
4)  the overall slowing effect on Serbia’s transition.
37  
Not only did the G17 Plus openly question the legitimacy of the EU’s political and economic 
demands, but also the party’s political positions translated into an 11.5% share of public support in 
the December 2003 early parliamentary elections in Serbia, after only a year in existence and 
several months of political campaigning.  
In both Serbia and Montenegro, the EU’s conditions have been very divisive and the domestic 
political space highly fragmented. Notably, political formations with good reform credentials 
favouring democratisation and market-oriented economic policies made the case against the EU’s 
sovereignty conditions and were able to mobilise substantial constituencies in support of their 
position. These political parties did not identify their domestic political interests with the changes 
demanded by the EU nor did they see the benefits offered by the EU as exceeding the costs of 
complying with the EU’s conditions, regardless of the initial submission to EU pressure.  
Softer mechanisms of argumentation and persuasion after the initial period of strong pressure to 
sign up to the deal failed to convince political actors in Serbia and Montenegro of the merits of 
rebuilding a single market and common institutions. The ruling elites regarded the EU’s 
intervention as lacking legitimacy, for varying reasons. This perception in turn fuelled hopes that a 
change of EU policy was possible and, if the right arguments were employed, EU policy-makers 
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37 Ibid.  THE LIMITS OF THE EU’S NORMATIVE POWER IN THE WESTERN BALKANS | 15 
 
could be convinced to soften the conditionality policy, if not completely reverse it. International 
socialisation could not take place given the perceived strategic behaviour of the EU in the wider 
Balkan region.  
3.2  Bosnia and Herzegovina  
BiH’s reform track to date can be regarded as partially compliant with the EU’s demands. Progress 
on domestic changes required by the EU has been painfully slow, and bold initiatives aimed at state 
consolidation and reinforcement of the central level of government have been driven by external 
actors in most cases, although progressively with the consent of domestic political elites (Hayden, 
2005). By the end of 2006, the two ‘to-do’ lists of conditions that BiH had received from Brussels 
in 2000 and 2003 respectively had been largely fulfilled with the exception of police restructuring, 
public broadcasting reforms and full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for 
former Yugoslavia (European Commission, 2007). In light of its expectations of compliance with 
these requirements and its assessment of the overall state of affairs in the country, the European 
Commission did not judge BiH sufficiently prepared to sign an SAA in the first half of 2007, 
although the technical negotiations had been concluded by the end of 2006.  
Has the EU policy line been seen as legitimate from a domestic point of view? The political scene 
in BiH has not been consensual on the question of acquiescing to the specific reforms requested by 
the EU. The (Bosniak) Party of Democratic Action (SDA) considered the principal expounder of 
Bosniak ethnic interests is in favour of abolishing the entities and cantons and rationalising the 
governance structure of BiH, by introducing a two-tier system with a stronger central government 
and a substantively empowered municipal level of governance (ICG, 2003). The SDA has always 
stood for an independent, united and strong Bosnian state with its own history, traditions and 
cultural heritage. The Croat community, represented by the long-time dominant Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ BiH),
38 has held a shifting position on the Dayton entity structure, from 
advocating a third (Croat) entity in the late 1990s, through supporting the elimination of the entities 
altogether in the early 2000s (ICG, 2003, pp. 19–21), to favouring a federal structure with three 
‘national-majority’ units in the 2006 round of domestic talks on constitutional reform.
39 In principle, 
however, the EU’s demands for reinforcing the mandates of the state institutions are not against the 
political platforms of the SDA or HDZ BiH, notwithstanding the differences in their motives. These 
two parties are, in this sense, more receptive to arguments exposing the inefficiencies of the Dayton 
institutional setting and justifying the necessity of change. The EU’s explicit conditionality only 
adds an additional layer of legitimacy for the institutional and policy reforms they support. 
The reform-minded political forces in BiH that formed the core of the Alliance for Change coalition 
that was in power between 2000 and 2002 – the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Party for 
BiH (SBiH) – do not oppose the rationalisation of the institutional framework of BiH. In fact, they 
keenly support the strengthening of the competences of the state and see no rationale for the 
existence of an expensive and cumbersome multi-tier system of governance that is more concerned 
with ethnic representation than with the provision of public services to the average citizen.
40 While 
                                                 
38 A breakaway faction of HDZ BiH – HDZ 1990 – has been gaining prominence in Bosnian politics and 
challenging the dominant position of HDZ BiH as the principle Croat party in BiH. 
39 See Office of the High Representative, 31
st Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the 
Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Sarajevo, 16 
May 2007 (available from http://www.ohr.int). 
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they were in government together with eight small parties as coalition partners, they pushed forward 
the reform agenda with the firm support of the Office of the High Representative, but were too 
weak and fragmented to make radical and lasting changes in many policy domains (Vachudova, 
2006). The EU is a natural ally for them, not least because the EU conditionality implies the gradual 
phasing-out of the HR’s ‘Bonn powers’ through insistence on self-governance (domestic 
sovereignty) as a basic prerequisite for BiH’s eligibility for EU membership.
41 
The EU’s conditions are viewed differently in the RS, however. Seen from Banja Luka, the changes 
sought by the EU would erode the sovereign competencies of the entity government and constitute a 
threat to the very existence of the RS. This is the line that has been taken by most political parties in 
the RS, which have traditionally obstructed any changes to the Dayton system owing to fears of 
marginalisation in a more centralised system of governance and which have been hiding their 
interests in the status quo behind nationalist slogans. Not only the hard-line, nationalist Serb 
Democratic Party (SDS) that dominated RS politics until the October 2006 elections, but also the 
moderate political groups in the RS, such as the Party of Democratic Progress (PDP) and the 
Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), have defended the status of the RS within the 
overall constitutional setting of BiH, although the latter two have been more pragmatic with regard 
to reforms that improve domestic governance.
42 Thus, the political power of the ruling elites in the 
RS is directly at stake when decisions on complying with the EU’s conditions are made. The EU’s 
demands for the centralisation of public authority at the state level clash with the vested interests in 
the status quo of those political parties holding the levers of power at the entity level. 
It is not surprising that the appropriateness of the EU’s conditions was only questioned by the ruling 
parties in the RS, which repeatedly invoked the Dayton provisions to argue that the reforms 
demanded by the EU were unconstitutional (Skrbic, 2005; Stanimirovic, 2005). Needless to say, for 
them the refusal to reform meant the continuation of the system of political patronage. With the 
transfer of power to the state level, the responsibilities for managing public funds and public sector 
employment would shift from entity- to state-level institutions as well. Considering the long-term 
refusal by the RS to give up its entity competences, compliance with the EU’s conditions is seen by 
the RS as a major surrender of its power. Irrespective of this rationale, the message of the RS to the 
Bosnian Serb population has had distinctive nationalist overtones, systematically reviving the idea 
of holding a referendum on independence, if not reunification with Serbia, as seen in the political 
campaigning prior to the October 2006 general elections. This rhetoric, however, has further 
undermined their standing vis-à-vis the EU and the international community at large, which has not 
hesitated to condemn any resurgence of nationalism in the region. In essence, the nationalists’ room 
for manoeuvre has been narrowing down.  
That is not to say that external legitimacy alone explains some of the compliance decisions taken by 
the same nationalist political formations. The transfer of sovereignty to the BiH state level as a 
result of compliance with EU conditionality is not perceived as an absolute loss by RS politicians. 
Regaining domestic sovereignty is an additional incentive for them to comply with the EU’s 
conditions as they have the promise of graduating permanently from the HR’s policy direction and 
supervision. The EU membership prospect is thus providing a convenient way out of the Bonn 
powers of the HR. In fact, soon after the RS’s nominal endorsement of police reform in October 
2005, the Bosnian Prime Minister Adnan Terzic appealed to the EU to put an end to the mandate of 
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the HR and strengthen the office of the European Commission in Sarajevo (Beunderman, 2005). 
Conversely, following a U-turn on police reform and difficult talks among domestic actors on a new 
deal in the course of 2006, the international community decided to extend the mandate of the Office 
of the High Representative for one year, reversing a previous agreement to close it down by mid-
2007 (Palmer, 2007).  
Persuasion and argumentation have played an important role in winning domestic popular and 
political support for the reforms sought by the EU. The EU has had the backing of important 
political allies in the domestic context who have viewed its demands as legitimate and authoritative. 
It has also had good reasons to stand firm and play tough with domestic opponents to its 
conditionality, the majority of them coming from the least reform-minded groups, some with hard-
line nationalist inclinations. It has been difficult for these obstructionist groups to counter the 
‘Europe argument’, which in the case of BiH has had strong references to European standards of 
domestic governance and powerful messages against the politics of according privileges to private 
political interests and nurturing patronage networks. As a result, the EU has been more successful in 
advancing its policy objectives, although the record is mixed to date.  
3.3  Serbia and Kosovo  
The way Kosovo’s final status negotiations have unfolded so far suggests that an imposed 
settlement for the province’s statehood is in the making, which may ultimately lead to imposed 
compliance. UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari’s plan for granting Kosovo ‘supervised 
independence’ has been firmly rejected by Serbia, with Russia opposing any solution that has not 
been negotiated with and approved by Belgrade. Kosovo’s authorities have backed the proposal, 
although they have expressed reservations about the unspecified timeframe of the international 
presence in the province. With the UN special envoy pronouncing the two sides’ positions as 
unbridgeable in March 2007, the final verdict is now in the hands of the UN Security Council, 
where power politics is the name of the game, but reaching an agreement among its permanent and 
non-permanent members on this matter is not straightforward. The EU member states, while not 
completely consensual on the proposed settlement by Martti Ahtisaari, have so far managed to 
speak with a united voice and have been rather consistent in their backing of the UN-led status 
process and Martti Ahtisaari’s personal role in it. 
What have been the drivers behind domestic reactions in both Serbia and Kosovo to the 
international proposal about the province’s final status? The EU’s problem-solving approach is 
certainly not convincing for the majority of the Serbian political leadership and population, for 
whom the issue is very emotional and closely linked to symbolic elements in Serbian identity. Not 
only have the radical nationalists of Vojislav Seselj (the Serbian Radical Party or SRS) and the 
socialists of the Milosevic regime (the Socialist Party of Serbia or SPS) opposed independence for 
Kosovo. So too have the moderate nationalists of Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica (the 
Democratic Party of Serbia or DSS) and the pro-Western reformers of President Boris Tadic (the 
Democratic Party or DS), although some more fervently than others. In fact, the Kostunica-led 
coalition government pushed through a new constitution in a referendum in October 2006, which 
reaffirmed Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia (ICG, 2006).  
At the popular level, a majority of Serbian citizens is believed to be in favour of preserving a link 
with Kosovo, although it is difficult to say the exact balance of the anti-independence camp and the 
group willing to put the past behind and look forward to Serbia’s European future, even if this 
means accepting an independent Kosovo. In July 2006, the British journal the Economist 18 | GERGANA NOUTCHEVA
  
 
entertained the idea of ‘two Serbias’: “one is conservative, nationalist, and backward-looking; the 
other is liberal, modern, and progressive”.
43 The majority of Serbian political leaders avoid taking 
the political risk of declaring openly that they would sign up to Kosovo’s eventual independence 
even though there is not much they could do to avert such a scenario. Indeed, accepting an imposed 
solution may well save them the political negatives of voluntarily surrendering what Serbs see as 
15% of the country’s territory. The two parties whose political platforms are most flexible on the 
Kosovo issue are the Liberal Democratic Party and the G17 Plus, receiving respectively 5.3% and 
6.8% of the popular vote in the parliamentary elections in January 2007 (Dombey, Macdonald & 
Wagstyl, 2007).  
There are good rational arguments as to why Serbia is better off in the long run without Kosovo but 
they have not been put forward forcefully by any Serbian actor. The political programme of G17 
Plus comes closest to acknowledging that from an economic standpoint it would be very costly for 
Serbia to hold on to an underdeveloped province such as Kosovo. Furthermore, the demographic 
projections play against the ethnic Serbs in a common state, with Kosovo’s young and rapidly 
growing population promising to challenge the Serbian majority in the medium to long term.
44 In 
short, from a Serbian perspective, rational reasons for backing an independent Kosovo are not 
lacking but Serbia’s position has not been defined exclusively by rationality. Identity considerations 
play a crucial role in determining the Serbian official line.  
In addition, there is a deeply entrenched perception among Serbia’s political establishment that 
through the imposition of Kosovo’s independence from the outside, present-day democratic Serbia 
is being ‘punished’ for the wrongdoings of an authoritarian regime in Belgrade that belongs to the 
past.
45 Certainly, the EU and the international community at large have been very careful not to play 
into the hands of the radical political groups and not to empower the nationalists through the 
expected popular backlash when announcing the plans for Kosovo’s conditional independence 
(Burgis, 2006). In fact, this is the argument the Serbian democratic leaders have used extensively to 
try to delay, if not totally prevent the announcement of Kosovo’s future independence.
46 To avoid 
such a worst-case scenario, UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari, who was due to release his proposal on 
Kosovo’s status by the end of 2006, waited strategically for the results of the parliamentary 
elections in Serbia on 21 January 2007 before publicly presenting his ideas. In the run-off to the 
elections, various EU political leaders openly expressed their support for the democratic parties, 
thus rendering further credibility to their electoral campaigns, while promising deeper ties with the 
EU (Rettman, 2006).  
On Kosovo’s side, all the political formations and the majority of the ethnic Albanian population 
(around 90%) have openly claimed their right to self-determination since 1999. From their point of 
view, full independence is the only legitimate outcome. They are unlikely to challenge the plans for 
eventual independence of the province although the provisions constraining its domestic 
sovereignty for an unspecified period have caused unease among Kosovo’s political leadership.  
 
                                                 
43 See the article, “Serbia’s New Nationalism”, Economist, 20 July 2006.  
44 See the G17 Plus political programme on its website (available from http://www.g17plus.org.yu/ 
english/index.html).   
45 Derived from interviews with Serbian government officials, November 2006–January 2007. 
46 Derived from interviews with EU officials, November 2006–January 2007.  THE LIMITS OF THE EU’S NORMATIVE POWER IN THE WESTERN BALKANS | 19 
 
Focused on securing their external sovereignty first, the Kosovars have so far mostly objected to the 
slow pace of the status process by pointing to the detrimental effects on Kosovo’s economy and 
society of the protracted uncertainty surrounding its future.  
On the whole, the political establishment in Pristina, with the exception of the Serbian minority 
leadership, has been consensual in defending a common position vis-à-vis Serbia and the rest of the 
world. Identity reasons as well as appeals to moral justice have been at the core of Kosovo’s quest 
for independence, although the political interests of the leadership in governing a state rather than a 
province of a larger entity are also well served by such an outcome. The latter considerations, 
however, would not have had resonance with the international community. The mass human rights 
violations against Kosovar Albanians by the Milosevic regime have represented the strongest 
foundation of legitimacy for defending the right of the Kosovar population to self-determination 
(Rehn, 2007b).  
4. Conclusions   
This paper has argued that the EU’s policy in the Western Balkans has been driven by the security 
interests of the member states and that it has not been easy to explain and validate the EU’s 
demands with reference to its own internal norms and rules of governance or to universal principles 
of fairness and justice. This situation has opened up political space for domestic actors who are 
reluctant to comply with the EU’s conditions to contest EU policy positions on normative grounds. 
Exposing the strategic calculus of some of the EU’s demands has turned into a political tool in the 
hands of unwilling players, who have challenged the EU line and given preference to domestic 
sources of legitimacy. The EU has had more success when its more coercive means have supported 
a policy goal that is easy to explain by normative considerations. But when the EU has tried to 
exercise its influence against what it stands for as a community of values and as a system of 
governance, the EU’s efforts have been less productive. 
The three case studies have illustrated a range of reactions by domestic actors to the perceived 
strategic intentions of the EU. Serbia and Montenegro went their separate ways, thus rejecting the 
EU’s proposed formula for a single sovereign entity (the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro) 
after a three-year period of simulating compliance. Montenegro in particular mobilised domestic 
support against the external vision of its statehood and fought an intelligent battle to achieve 
international recognition as an independent state. Rational reasons helped Montenegro to win the 
argument in favour of dissolving the common state. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is going through a very slow and difficult process of redefining its 
statehood, with the EU’s incentives and disincentives intervening in the strategic thinking of key 
political players. Efficiency arguments play an important role in the interface between EU and BiH 
politics, and in providing the legitimacy base for reconstituting the sovereignty of the country in a 
way that is acceptable to a critical mass of domestic political actors and is compatible with the EU’s 
vision.  
Kosovo is likely to emerge as a new state judging by the way that the negotiations on its final 
settlement have unfolded, no matter what the exact details of its final status are. In its formation, 
external pragmatic factors and internal identity issues are converging on an outcome that is 
considered legitimate from the viewpoint of a large majority of Kosovars and illegitimate from the 
viewpoint of a large majority of Serbs. The Serbian leadership has strongly objected to the EU’s 
problem-solving approach, and has defied any attempt to disconnect from what it sees as its 20 | GERGANA NOUTCHEVA
  
 
territory protected by international law and the UN Charter. Non-compliance in this case, justified 
on identity grounds, is likely to lead to an imposed solution from the outside, with the EU’s help.  
The paper has shown an alternative way of explaining the effects of international socialisation on 
EU accession candidates. Far too often, the conditions for successful socialisation have been 
attributed to domestic receptiveness towards external normative claims, while assuming the 
normative foundations of that influence. This study has suggested that the legitimacy of the EU’s 
external actions has to be closely examined before assessing the potential of the EU as an agent of 
socialisation and ‘a force for good’. 
The paper has thus offered a different approach for examining the normative and strategic 
dimensions of the EU’s foreign policy. It has proposed studying the EU’s power to influence non-
EU countries through the prism of how they perceive the motivation of the EU’s actions. As such, it 
has made the case for widening the debate about the EU’s foreign policy to include contributions 
that focus on the external impact of the EU’s actions. In so doing, it has tried to link the study of EU 
foreign policy to the literature on Europeanisation that developed in the context of the EU’s 
enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. More empirical research on other geographical areas is 
needed to complement the analysis of the EU’s leverage in the Western Balkans before further 
general arguments can be advanced about the nature and facets of the EU’s external power.  
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